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The Dynamics of Expectations: A Sequential 
Perspective on Macroeconomic Forecasting1
Abstract: The chapter claims forecasting is a process during which forecasts are regu-
larly updates and revised. Paying attention to the dynamics of expectations provides 
the opportunity to study changes in expectations formed by professionals, and thus 
give insights into how their labor unfolds. Drawing upon data from a purposely-
built database of forecasts running from September 2006 to September 2017, linear 
and logistic regression models investigate the informational and organizational 
grounds of forecasts revisions. It suggests that similar forecasts form a consistent 
sequence, so that revisions mostly consist in the adjustments of ‘old’ forecasts with 
respect to newly available information. By and large, forecasting means updating 
former forecasts. Besides, data shows the core activity of forecasting organizations, 
and in turn their audience, matter to understand the extent to which they revise their 
forecasts: despite what forecasters claim in interviews, public institutions, among 
which the IMF or the OECD, tend to revise their forecasts on a wider scale than pri-
vate banks or insurance companies. Eventually, scrutinizing how forecasts revisions 
distribute according to the years during which they are produced, stress that during 
major economic crises, such as the Great Recession, forecasters not only revise their 
former expectations downward but also upward. This hints at a Durkheim-inspired 
interpretation of economic crises as re-opening the future.
Keywords: Macroeconomic forecasting, forecasters, sequence, temporalities, or-
ganizations, regression analysis
1.  Introduction
While neoclassical economic theories often assume certainty to be a key fea-
ture of economies, other social sciences, along with some subfields of eco-
nomics, have long emphasized the importance of uncertainty in the ‘real’, or 
 1 The French National Research Agency (ANR) as part of the “Investissements 
d’avenir” program within the framework of the LIEPP center of excellence 
(ANR11LABX0091, ANR 11 IDEX000502) funded this research. I am grateful 
to Valerie Arnhold (CSO) and Ulrich Fritsche (Universität Hamburg) for their 
comments on earlier versions of the text.
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‘empirical’, economic world. Uncertainty has been scrutinized from at least 
three points of view, respectively referring to the properties of commodities, 
to individual behaviors, and to the ontology of economies. First, uncertainty 
arises from unobservable qualities of goods and products. (Akerlof 1970) 
famously shows that asymmetric information implies releasing the theoret-
ical hypotheses of perfect information and homogeneity and, empirically, 
may lead to sub-optimality and, eventually, to the collapse of markets. 
Studying a similar topic, namely uncertainty over quality, sociologists 
highlight it renders obsolete price-based choices and requires turning to 
judgment devices (Karpik 2010). Secondly, ‘boundedly rational’ actors 
face difficulties to analyze complex situations and, as a result, to discern 
‘optimal’ solutions – all the more so as the ultimate consequences of action 
remain unknown (Simon 1959). Uncertainty here arises from actors’ lim-
ited computational abilities: Unable to reach the ‘best’ solution, economic 
actors pursue ‘satisficing’, rather than ‘optimizing’, solutions. Thirdly, 
uncertainty is a common property of ‘real world’ situations: The classic 
distinction between risk and uncertainty (Keynes 1921; Knight 1921) sheds 
light on the ontological differences between situations where outcomes can 
be associated to a defined set of probabilities, and those where “there is no 
scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever. We 
simply do not know.” (Keynes 1937, 214) Whether its sources lie in individ-
uals, objects, or the economic system, uncertainty prevents from attaining 
the conditions of general equilibrium and therefore makes it impossible to 
reach optimality, or efficiency (Beckert 2002). In extreme cases, uncertainty 
prohibits any economic activity.
In a functionalist perspective, forecasting aims at providing economic 
actors with depictions of the future to enable action. When uncertainty 
prevails, actors’ decisions are necessarily anchored in ‘fictions’, requiring 
actors a priori to ‘suspend disbelief’ and adopt an ‘as if’ convention. When 
the future has yet to be created and cannot be known at present (Shackle 
1972), economic actors can base their action only on ‘fictional expecta-
tions’  – that is, “pretended representations of a future state of affairs” 
(Beckert 2013, 226). In this perspective, ‘instruments of imagination’, 
among which forecasts, fuel actors’ imagination – they eventually build 
the fictional expectations upon which economic action and coordination 
are based (Beckert 2016).
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2.  Shifting the Focus from Outcomes to Processes
Most literature on macroeconomic forecasting deals with ‘errors’, through 
the comparison between forecasts and actual economic performance. 
Indeed, assessing such errors relies on the ex post comparison between 
‘what actually happened’ and ‘what had been predicted’ – a reality test 
forecasters often discard as ‘irrelevant’ or ‘ineffective’ (Pilmis 2018). 
Following for example the outburst of the Great Recession, explanations of 
collective forecasting failures often focus on econometric models: in partic-
ular, economists advocate for new forms of macroeconometric modelling 
that would include financial cycles (Borio 2014) or reduce the discrepancies 
between the ‘real’ world and the one models create (Taleb 2007; Caballero 
2010). Other hypotheses stress the importance of cognition and beliefs in 
the economic world. While behavioral economists emphasize the impor-
tance of ‘animal spirits’ in finance and in the economy (Akerlof and Shiller 
2009), it is worth noting that the notion applies to forecasters as well as 
to ‘ordinary’ economic actors. Combining Durkheimian and Bourdieusian 
traditions, sociologists underline that economists’ adherence to a domi-
nant vision of the economic order form the common ground upon which 
similar interpretations of economic situations are built (Lebaron 2010).
Although inspiring, these sets of explanations remain partly unsatis-
factory. Approaches dealing with econometric models often share an 
optimistic, and somehow positivist, belief that improved future models 
will be robust enough to provide an accurate approximation of economic 
mechanisms. It claims a continuous ‘march towards progress’ will even-
tually put an end to most forecasting mistakes since they result from mere 
technical problems. Such explanations nonetheless make no reference to 
the social dynamics within the world of forecasting and concentrate on 
the sole statistical puzzles econometricians are bound to solve:  It thus 
offers little insight into the actual process of forecasting. Whether they 
originate from economics or sociology, a major drawback of ‘cognitive’ 
explanations lie in their almost tautological nature. One may provoca-
tively summarize them as follows: ‘Forecasters make the same predictions 
because they agree on how the economy works’, or even ‘They see the 
same things because they think the same way.’ Consensus then becomes 
self-explanatory, resulting from either socio-historical configurations of 
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the profession of economist (Fourcade 2010), the interwoven theoretical, 
political and ideological grounds of economic thinking (Lebaron 2000), 
or herd behavior. Keynes’s famous analysis of a ‘beauty contest’ (Keynes 
1936) shows that herding can be a rational strategy for actors facing 
uncertainty: In a game-theoretical perspective, mutual observation grants 
access to formerly private information, allowing individual behaviors to 
adapt accordingly (Chamley 2003). Obviously, forecasters are no excep-
tion: among them, consensus partly emerges from the observation of peers 
and especially from the observations of organizations that are deemed to 
hold information before earlier than others (major statistical agencies, for 
instance). However, in addition to reducing social processes to the sole 
spreading of information, the analysis of rational herds often leaves the 
issues its production raises in the shade.
Indeed, focusing on ‘errors’ rules out whole areas of the activity and 
process of forecasting. It pays attention to the opus operatum but provides 
little information about the modus operandi. Shedding light on forecasting 
as an on-going process rather than on its outcomes departs from how it is 
usually understood. Moving backstage, sociologists emphasize the collec-
tive dimension of forecasting and stress the importance of social networks 
in its making (Evans 2007) as well as the role of the ‘epistemic partici-
pation’ of the object of forecasters’ inquiry, namely the economy, to the 
very process of forecasting (Reichmann 2013). However, these scholarly 
works usually pay attention to one singular institution (e.g., one academic 
research center, or one central bank) rather than to the broader world 
of forecasting. More, they often implicitly assume forecasts from a same 
institution are widely unrelated, so that forecasting exercises could be 
studied independently from each other.
This chapter advocates for a different approach to the forecasting pro-
cess, which emphasizes forecasting sequences made of successive forecasts 
of a similar object. Indeed, forecasters issue several forecasts for a same 
horizon, a same country, and a same variable – usually at the end of each 
quarter. To take an extreme example, the United States Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) produced more than twenty different projections of 
the US GDP (Gross Domestic Product) growth at the end of year 2017 – 
forecasts being produced twice a year (usually in January and August) up 
to ten years in advance. For the same variable, country, and horizon, the 
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) produced ten different projections – 
at the end of the first and third quarters of year y-5 (here, 2012), and at 
the end of each quarter of both years y-1 (2016) and y (2017). Each new 
forecast revises the preceding one to reflect the incorporation of newly 
available economic information  – the implied changes being sometimes 
dramatic (see Fig. 1 for an illustration).
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Fig. 1: CBO Forecasts of US Real GDP Growth at the End of 2010 and 2017.
Source: Congressional Budget Office, Budget and Economic Outlook (https://www.cbo.gov/
about/products/major-recurring-reports#1).
Understanding the process and nature of forecasting requires paying 
special attention to forecasts revisions. From a theoretical perspective, 
revisions provide the opportunity to study changes in expectations formed 
by professionals, and give insights into how their labor unfolds. It allows 
investigating the weight of various factors, related either to the properties 
of the forecasted object, to the identity of forecasters, or to the historical 
and institutional environment of forecasting. This approach differs from 
Nordhaus’s (1987) which, through the analogy with financial markets 
(Fama 1970), concentrates on forecasts ‘efficiency’ and makes little, if any, 
difference between revisions and ‘errors’. It obviously conveys normative 
statements as to the process it evaluates and, because it focuses on the 
use of information rather than on its availability, misses a key aspect of 
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forecasting. For example, the deepening of economic crises, which the suc-
cessive releases from statistical bureaus trace, prevents forecast revision 
at date t to be independent from that at date t-1 – contrarily to what the 
efficiency hypothesis implies.
3.  Data and Material
The text exposes early results from ongoing research on macroeconomic 
governance. It draws upon data from a purposely-built database of 
forecasts running from September 2006 to September 2017 (designated 
below as ‘Forecasts Database’). Firstly, data first drawn from ‘Consensus 
Forecasts’,2 a series of monthly economic forecasts from professional 
forecasters. In order to match the quarterly pace of actual forecasting, 
collected forecasts were produced at the end of each quarter (March, 
June, September and December3). In other words, the database contains 
a sample of all ‘Consensus Forecasts’ issues over an eleven-year period 
(size  =  ⅓), and almost exhaustively represents all the end-of-quarter 
releases. Secondly, institutional forecasters usually grant access to their 
publications online, and enable retrieving the IMF World Economic 
Outlook, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) Economic Outlook, the European Commission (EC) Economic 
Outlook or the CBO Budget and Economic Outlook.4 The ‘Forecasts data-
base’ eventually gathers more than 32,000 forecasts about two macroeco-
nomic variables (GDP growth and inflation, using ‘consumer prices’ as a 
proxy in the latter case) and eight countries or group of countries (China, 
France, Germany, Greece, Japan, United Kingdom, United States, and the 
Eurozone). Each forecast is further characterized by its point value, its 
date t, its (more or less distant) horizon and, when appropriate, the date 
and magnitude of its revision between t-1 and t. The approach taken here 
 2 Consensus Forecasts™ are publications from Consensus Economics™, a 
London-based organization established in 1989 which claims to be “the world’s 
leading macroeconomic survey firm” (Consensus Economics website, http://
www.consensuseconomics.com, accessed June 25, 2019).
 3 This rule suffered only one exception: “Consensus Forecasts” for December 
2011 were missing and thus replaced by data from January 2012.
 4 Appendix A displays these institutional sources with greater details.
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seemingly reduces forecasting to mere calculation, while forecasts encap-
sulate not only figures but also scenarios. It is assumed here that both 
go together: Figures may on occasion mitigate scenarios, but they mostly 
express them in a numerical fashion.
This chapter more specifically relies on a subset of the ‘Forecasts database’. 
In order to keep a balanced panel, analyses exclude forecasts about China 
and Greece, as well as those whose horizon exceeds 24 months.5 Besides, 
forecast organizations are distinguished according to their main activity:
 – Public institutions gather institutional forecasters, that is organizations 
such as IMF, OECD, EC, and CBO. They produce closely scrutinized 
figures and scenarios about a large number of countries.
 – Major banks are multinational banks whose subsidiaries or national 
offices produce macroeconomic forecasts for various countries. Here, 
such banks comprise Bank of America (including Merrill Lynch), 
Citigroup, Crédit Suisse, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JP Morgan, Morgan 
Stanley, UBS and Unicredit.
 – Other banks designates the remaining organizations of the banking 
sector.
 – Other organizations mostly regroup insurance companies (e.g. AIG, 
Allianz, Axa, Dai-Ichi Life, etc.), business firms with a department 
devoted to macroeconomic forecasting (among others, DuPont, FedEx, 
Ford, General Motors, Total or Toyota), research centers, consulting 
firms, rating companies, etc.
4.  Are Predictions Predictable? Forecasting as a Sequence
At some point, the purpose of forecasting is to compute the economic 
future by means of macroeconomic information, the largest part of which 
is made available to the community of forecasters by data providers and 
statistical bureaus. Scheduled press releases and embargos enable a simul-
taneous access to recent data for all forecasters and economists.
We forecast continuously: We are equipped with databases to feed Excel spreadsheets. 
Supply comes straight from databases once the GDP is out – a quarter an hour later, 
 5 Appendix B provides a more precise account of the panel structure.
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and even sometimes at the same minute. When the US figures are released, they are 
under embargo but they are already delivered to the press and data providers and, 
say, the embargo is lifted at 8 or 8:30 NY time, hop!, all the data becomes public at 
once through press agencies and data providers, and I get them on Excel, like, five 
or ten minutes later… that depends on the data provider, sometimes it needs maybe 
an hour. Then, they pour out… I don’t know, about one country, you get 20 or 30 
entries. I don’t use them all but I do get them that way, automatically.
Chief economist, Insurance company, French citizen, born early 1960’s, 
December 2015.6
In this regard, the world of macroeconomic forecasting displays some 
features of quasi-perfect information. Most, if not all, macroeconomic 
information is available and, what is more, purposely-designed devices 
implement symmetry and ensure economists and forecasters all get the same 
information at the same time. Since forecasting often consists in extrapo-
lating recent data to spot economic trends, the nature, amount and accu-
racy of information is critical to produce forecasts. Even though forecasters 
willingly compare their activity to some kind of ‘art’ which would require 
experience-based intuition to ‘feel’ the coming tendencies and identify key 
figures within a large-sized dataset, forecasts values may decisively depend 
on the information available and their basic properties (e.g. the forecasted 
variable or country). Provided information is symmetric, the date on which 
forecasts are produced and previous forecasts values may serve as proxies 
for new and past information, respectively. Testing such hypotheses requires 
linear regression modelling of the relationship between forecast value at 
time t (vt) and a varying set of independent variables. Tab. 1 displays four 
different models, which share the same ordinary least square (OLS) method. 
Model 1 tests the autoregressive vector vt  =  α0 + α0 vt-1+ ε. For models 
2–4, dummies enable including qualitative independent variables, such as 
forecasters’ activity, country, or forecasted variable. When continuous inde-
pendent variables are significant, using dummies also allows breaking them 
into discreet modalities to scrutinize their impact: Especially, in the case of 
production years, it enables paying attention to specific economic conjunc-
ture, rather than considering ‘time’ as a mere duration.
 6 All excerpts are part of a larger qualitative study, made of 48 in-depth interviews. 
The author has conducted them since June 2014 (average duration: 80 minutes) 
with economists and forecasters from public (either national or international) 
and private (banks, insurance companies, and so on) institutions.
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Tab. 1: Linear Regression Modelling of Forecast Valuesa
       Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Fo
re
ca
st
s
Country
Eurozone 0.036** -0.734*** -0.741***
France n.s. -0.861*** -0.853***
Germany 0.062*** -0.581*** -0.582***
Japan n.s. -1.247*** -1.241***
United Kingdom 0.062*** -0.186*** -0.191***
United States ref ref ref
Variable
GDP ref ref ref
Inflation 0.088*** 0.113*** 0.114***
Distance to horizon 0.023*** -0.004***
Fo
re
ca
st
er
s
Bank
Major bank n.s. n.s.
Other bank ref ref
Public institution n.s. n.s.
Other organization n.s. n.s.
C
on
te
xt Year
2006
0.005*** -0.014***
0.573***
2007 0.368***
2008 0.060*
2009 -2.050***
2010 n.s.
2011 0.279***
2012 -0.291***
2013 -0.245***
2014 n.s.
2015 -0.299***
2016 -0.379***
2017 ref
Previous forecast value 0.999*** 0.999***
Intercept -0.073*** -9.438*** 29.594*** 1.938***
Adjusted R-squared 0.8199 0.8217 0.1286 0.3794
df 24,737 24,729 29,701 29,691
N 27,739 24,739 29,713 29,713
Method: OLS. Signif. codes : ***: Pr. < 0.001. **: Pr. < 0.01. *: Pr. < 0.05
aSource: Forecasts Database Subset
 
Olivier Pilmis172
Tab. 1 exhibits that simple linear regression modelling, including a small 
set of independent variables, accurately ‘predicts’ macroeconomic fore-
cast values. It is noticeable that the identity of forecasting organizations 
holds little, if any, role: There is no significant difference between banks, 
public institutions and other organizations. In contrast, the very object of 
forecasting matters. Regarding countries, the modelled coefficients unsur-
prisingly reflect the hierarchy of macroeconomic performances, since 
forecasts are often continuation of past trends into the future. Although 
not always in a strictly linear manner, the horizon also weighs in forecasts 
value: All other things kept equal, and the impact of conjuncture being 
controlled for, longer-term forecasts look more optimistic than shorter-
term. In addition, the forecasts are sensitive to their context of production. 
Here again, the outburst of the Great Recession (especially year 2009) is 
easy to spot through spectacularly negative coefficients. These results sup-
port the claim according to which data providers are decisive actors who 
disseminate the economic and statistical raw information necessary to pro-
duce forecasts. All organizations being granted access to the same infor-
mation at the same time, their precise nature, singularities and peculiarities 
make little difference, all the more so as cooperation is a key feature of 
the social world of forecasting (Evans 2007; Reichmann 2013). Shared 
economic information lead to fairly similar forecasts. To say it bluntly, 
forecasters seemingly lack ‘imagination’, and forecasting appears data-
driven to a large extent.
Yet, the most remarkable result lies in the decisive role of previous 
values to understand newly produced ones. Removing the previous fore-
cast from regression models dramatically diminishes their goodness of fit, 
as shown by the R2 dropping from around 0.82 (model 2) to 0.13 (model 
3). The finding stresses that forecasting is a process which continuously 
incorporates new economic information, rather than a series of unre-
lated operations. Forecasting widely draw upon preceding forecasts which 
supposedly embrace recent economic trends. That forecasts are actually 
self-referential is well-known in economics. “Forecasters,” Nordhaus 
(1987, 668)  writes, “tend to have a certain consistency (stickiness?) in 
their views of the world, so that recent forecasts will go far in explaining 
current forecasts.” A broader explanation for such self-reference argues 
previous forecasts encapsulate, not only forecasters’ own views about the 
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future,7 but also the amount of economic information available at time 
t-1 – the persistence of some information from one period to the next then 
contributes to the stickiness of forecasts. Indeed, revising forecasts by def-
inition implies forecasting exercises seldom start from scratch. The impor-
tance of ‘post-mortem’ in the world of macroeconomic forecasting – that 
is, the examination of former forecasts at the beginning of a new  exercise – 
demonstrates the connection between past and present forecasts: Improving 
future forecasts requires spotting flaws in previous similar forecasts. In 
line with the near-perfect correlation between two successive forecasts,8 it 
suggests that similar forecasts form a consistent sequence, so that revisions 
mostly consist in the adjustments of previous forecasts with respect to 
newly available information. By and large, forecasting means nothing but 
updating former forecasts.
5.  What Is Updating? The Informational 
Grounds of Forecasts Revisions
Studying updates sheds light on the practice of forecasting as well as on 
economic expertise as a whole. It especially suggests expertise not only 
originates from a defined set of knowledge and techniques, but is also 
anchored in a particular institutional setting. Indeed, interviewees some-
times relate forecast revisions to the properties of organizations, such as 
their main activity or the contours of their audience.
–   There is a major difference as to how work is done here [a major French 
bank] and in the public sector – especially the OECD but the Planning Bureau 
[Dutch Centraal Planbureau] too. People in those places are very cautious. 
 7 Nordhaus (1987) often regards forecasters’ views in a behavioral perspective, 
drawing from Kahneman and Tversky’s depiction of the ‘anchoring effect’ 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1981). As most works in psychology-inspired behav-
ioral economics, such under-socialized perspective cannot truly account for 
social phenomena (Bergeron et al. 2018): Forecasters’ views are not just their 
own personal views, they are also grounded in the epistemology of economics as 
a whole, in the econometric tools they use, in the categories according to which 
the economy is described…
 8 Autogression Model properties (adjusted R2 = 0.8199, coefficient close to 1 – 
0.999) stress the almost perfect correlation between vt and vt-1. Autocorrelation 
coefficient for vt (all t) is 0.91.
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When the figures are bad… well, next ones may be good. You don’t know if 
this is the beginning of a new trend. You keep very cautious. And if you look 
at the forecasts from the Planning Bureau, there is little difference between 
one forecast and the other. Things are very different here because, here, it is of 
great importance to get the new trends – and yet, like the others, we missed 
the [2008] crisis in the US. […]
 – When you said “you keep very cautious”, what does it mean? Does it mean 
saying, when the figures look bad, that they might not be “that bad” and, 
likewise, when the figures look good, saying they might not be “that good”? 
Or does…
 – [Interrupting] Yes. Well, most importantly, in the case of the OECD and the 
Planning Bureau, because these institutions are carefully watched. And, when 
they release something about the US, they fear it will trigger a stock market 
crash. They want to avoid that. Their goal is not to spread panic. Things are 
different here because we are not a public institution – we don’t bear respon-
sibility to the general public. We assume liability to our investors. And we are 
under an obligation to warn them that things may turn very bad. Well, if that’s 
our impression, we don’t want to spread panic either, but we state “the risks 
are high”. […] And our forecasts can change far more dramatically. Also, one 
reason for this is that our clients do not really look backwards. I do. I take 
a look at what I  had forecasted three months earlier. But our clients don’t 
give a damn: they get our forecasts once every three months and that’s it. At 
the OECD, people are far more cautious when it comes to changing forecasts 
dramatically.
Forecaster, French Bank, Dutch Citizen, born mid-1950s.
In addition to stating a testable hypothesis, the interviewee highlights 
the role of revisions as a means for forecasters to check their own work. 
As a practical category, forecast ‘revisions’ encompass a variety of situ-
ations, so that several proxies may capture their intensity. As numerical 
re-assessments of coming economic evolutions, their measure is three-fold:
 1. A revision can first equate to the deviation, i.e. to the arithmetic differ-
ence, between the values v of forecast at time t and at time t-1: (vt − vt−1)
– called below ‘revisions’ without any further specification.
 2. The squared deviation allows studying the magnitude of revisions, 
whatever their sign:  (vt − vt−1/vt−1)2– designated below as ‘squared 
revisions’.
 3. Finally, squared relative deviation provide a same scale for all revisions 
and, accordingly, enables comparing them despite widely different face 
values:
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(vt − vt−1/vt−1)2. However, as forecasters often anticipate unchanged 
macroeconomic situations (meaning vt-1=0), using such an index poses 
difficulties.
Tabs. 2 and 3 expose the statistical distribution of forecasts revisions and 
squared revisions. Whatever the measure considered, forecasts revisions 
are not normally distributed. First, forecasters more often revise down-
ward than upward (mean and skewness are both negative) and revisions 
concentrate around the mean (kurtosis is over 20 in the case of revisions, 
and over 400 in the case of squared revisions). The distribution of squared 
revisions is especially spectacular, whose median (0.04) almost equals the 
minimal value (0 per definition)  – meaning half revisions belong to the 
interval [−0.2; 0.2]. However, more than one fifth of all revisions exceed 
0.5 point in absolute value, and more than 1 in 15 exceed 1.0 point. The 
implementation of linear regression models deepens the understanding of 
the impact of forecasts properties on the magnitude of their revisions. Tab. 
4 exposes the results of three models, which share the same dependent 
variable (above-defined forecasts revisions). Models 5–7 implement the 
Tab. 2: Distribution of Forecasts Revisions (Overview)a
  Mean Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis
Deviation -0.08 0.00 0.55 -2.29 20.84
Squared Deviation 0.30 0.04 1.38 16.52 410.49
 aSource: Forecasts Database subset
Tab. 3: Forecast Revisions by Type and Magnitudea
Type
Magnitude
Negative Positive Null Total
N % N % N % N %
[0–0.5[ 8,449 34.15 7,454 30.13 3,552 14.36 19,455 78.64
[0.5–1[ 2,065 8.35 1,685 6.81 3,750 15.16
[1-max] 1,100 4.44 434 1.75 1,534 6.20
Total 11,614 46.95 9,573 38.70 3,552 14.36 24,739 100
aSource: Forecasts Database subset. With null revisions excluded, χ2 = 195.11, df = 2, 
p<2.2e-16
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same method (OLS) as models 1–4, and dummies intervene in the same 
way. Tab. 5 displays the results from another series of linear regressions 
(models 8–10), which are identical to models 5–7 except for the dependent 
variable –then, squared revisions.
In a seemingly unsurprising manner, Tabs. 4 and 5 show that the higher 
the value of preceding forecasts, the larger their downward revisions. As 
to the distance to horizon, dummies hint at a partly non-linear effect, 
suggesting lower revisions occur on the shortest- (less than six months) 
and the longest-term (more than 18 months). Both tables stress the impact 
of macroeconomic conjuncture, as years 2008 and 2009 are associated to 
increased downward revisions (Tab. 4) and higher squared revisions (Tab. 
5). Last but not least, all models show a close positive association between 
(either squared or not) revisions at time t and at time t-1. As mentioned 
earlier, this hints at a (more or less) deliberate forecast smoothing, but it 
also relates to the informational structure of forecasting and to the well-
known difficulties to assess economic turns, during which actors encounter 
difficulties to reach diagnosis of either economic crisis or recovery. The 
relationship between forecasts revisions in t and t-1 partly reflects the 
release of new information which gradually confirms what previously 
appeared only as a possibility: In the end, data corroborates forecasters’ 
previous judgments and interpretations.
More interestingly, Tabs. 4 and 5 provide little support to the afore-
mentioned claim that ‘public organizations’ would be especially cautious 
as compared to the private banking system. Considering either revisions 
or squared revisions, public institutions differ from the other forecasting 
organizations by a tendency to revise their own forecasts more strongly. 
Conversely, professional forecasters more easily smooth their forecasts than 
institutional forecasters. This obviously contradicts the above-quoted fore-
caster. On the other hand, it reminds of what other forecasters state: “One 
forecaster told me that he smoothed his forecasts because a more accurate 
but jumpy forecast would ‘drive his customers crazy.’ President Carter 
indeed complained about the ‘inconsistency’ of his economic advisers, 
stating he was tempted to prefer the fortune teller at the Georgia State 
Fair. Another reader commented that too-quick forecast revisions would 
entail reversing decisions about investment plans too often.” (Nordhaus 
1987, 673) Besides supporting this claim, such results raise two additional 
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Tab. 4: Linear Regression Modelling of Forecast Revisionsa
      Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Fo
re
ca
st
s
Country
Eurozone 0.030*
France n.s.
Germany 0.052***
Japan n.s.
United Kingdom 0.045***
United States ref
Distance to horizon
0 to 5 months
-0.008***
ref
6 to 12 months -0.097***
13 to 18 months -0.079***
19 to 24 months n.s.
Fo
re
ca
st
er
s
Bank
Major Bank n.s.
Other bank ref
Public institution -0.071***
Other organization n.s.
C
on
te
xt
Year
2007
0.005***
-0.044*
2008 -0.326***
2009 -0.242***
2010 n.s.
2011 -0.101***
2012 -0.131***
2013 -0.073***
2014 -0.195***
2015 -0.173***
2016 -0.156***
2017 ref
Previous forecast 
value
Q1
-0.039***
ref
Q2 -0.166***
Q3 -0.272***
Q4 -0.455***
Previous forecast revision 0.178*** 0.217*** 0.183***
Intercept -0.069*** -0.105*** 0.314***
Adjusted R-squared 0.0329 0.0467 0.1524
df 19,659 19,656 16,635
N 19,661 19,661 19,661
Method: OLS. Signif. codes : ***: Pr. < 0.001. **: Pr. < 0.01. *: Pr. < 0.05.
Note: The inclusion of the previous revision requires taking into account three successive 
forecasts, therefore excluding forecasts produced during Year 2006.
aSource: Forecasts Database Subset
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Tab. 5: Linear Regression Modelling of Squared Forecast Revisionsa
      Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Fo
re
ca
st
s
Country
Eurozone -0.131***
France -0.163***
Germany n.s.
Japan 0.156***
United Kingdom n.s.
United States ref
Distance to horizon
0 to 5 months
0.021***
ref
6 to 12 months 0.379***
13 to 18 months 0.085**
19 to 24 months n.s.
Fo
re
ca
st
er
s
Bank
Major Bank n.s.
Other bank ref
Public institution 0.263***
Other organization n.s.
C
on
te
xt
Year 
2007
-0.057***
n.s.
2008 0.720***
2009 1.156***
2010 0.155**
2011 0.370***
2012 0.129**
2013 n.s.
2014 n.s.
2015 n.s.
2016 n.s.
2017 ref
Previous forecast  
value
Q1
-0.085***
ref
Q2 n.s.
Q3 n.s.
Q4 0.181***
Squared previous 
forecast revision 0.139*** 0.101*** 0.061***
Intercept 0.284*** 115.01*** -0.150**
Adjusted R-squared 0.0205 0.0422 0.0926
df 19,659 19,656 19,635
N 19,661 19,661 19,661
Method: OLS. Signif. codes : ***: Pr. < 0.001. **: Pr. < 0.01. *: Pr. < 0.05.
Note: The inclusion of the previous revision requires taking into account three successive 
forecasts, therefore excluding forecasts produced during Year 2006 (see Appendix A).
aSource: Forecasts Database Subset
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issues for future research. It first requires explaining the discrepancies 
between forecasters’ discourses:  How come professionals from a same 
field hold so widely contrasting views of its functioning? Secondly, both 
discourses stress the importance of audiences to understand the process 
of forecasting. It challenges the usually admitted idea that forecasting is 
solely data-driven and instead suggests studying forecasts and forecasters 
in their broader social environment, taking into account the specific needs 
and demands of their own audience.
A further investigation of the institutional setting of forecasting implies 
defining revisions as ‘events’ rather than ‘calculations’. Indeed, each fore-
cast revision holds a singular meaning, with respect to its sign (‘negative’ 
or ‘positive’) and magnitude (‘more or less than 0.5 point’). Some of these 
events are frequent enough to be modelled using logistic regression model-
ling (see Tab. 3). Each model then studies a specific binary dependent var-
iable (coded 0/1): negative revisions (model 11), positive revisions (model 
12), and revisions over 0.5 point (model 13). All models rely on Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation (MLE) and propose the same set of independent 
variables:
 – Country (6 modalities: Eurozone, France, Germany, Japan, UK and US)
 – Forecasted variable (2 modalities: GDP and Inflation)
 – Distance to horizon (4 modalities: 0–5, 6–12, 13–18, and 19–24 months)
 – Forecasting organization (4 modalities:  major banks, other banks, 
public institutions, other organizations)
 – Production year (12 modalities: 2006 to 2017)
 – Forecast value in t-1 (4 modalities: quartiles by year)
Results from Tab. 6 are consistent with the preceding linear regression 
models. They do not support the hypothesis that banks would more 
likely overreact to new information in order to warn their clients of 
coming downturns, while public institutions would be more cautious 
to avoid spreading panic. Indeed, public institutions are more prone to 
revise their forecasts downward (model 11) and to revise them strongly 
(model 13)  than any other organization in the panel. On the contrary, 
major banks lean toward rising successive forecasts, which further 
weakens the claim according to which they would mainly (or at least, 
more than other forecasting institutions) commit to alerting their clients 
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Tab. 6: Logistic Regression Modelling of Forecast Revisions (odds ratio)a
   Model 11
Dependent 
variable: 
Negative 
Revision
Model 12
Dependent 
variable:  
Positive Revision
Model 13
Dependent 
variable:
Abs. Revision 
≥ 0.5 pt
Fo
re
ca
st
s
Country
Eurozone 0.745*** n.s. 0.531***
France 0.851*** 0.722*** 0.544***
Germany 0.599*** 0.902* 0.784***
Japan 0.823*** n.s. n.s.
United 
Kingdom 0.670*** n.s. n.s.
United States ref ref ref
Variable
GDP ref ref ref
Inflation 0.895*** n.s. 0.689***
Distance to 
horizon
0 to 5 months ref ref ref
6 to 12 months 1.115** 1.086* 2.992***
13 to 18 months n.s. 0.847*** 1.276***
19 to 24 months n.s. 0.739** n.s.
Fo
re
ca
st
er
s
Bank
Major Bank n.s. 1.149*** n.s.
Other bank ref ref ref
Public institution 1.523*** 0.778*** 2.051***
Other organization n.s. n.s. n.s.
C
on
te
xt
Year
2006 1.685*** 0.560*** 0.575***
2007 0.619*** 1.394*** 0.606***
2008 1.573*** n.s. 3.945***
2009 n.s. 1.200** 3.367***
2010 0.490*** 2.021*** n.s.
2011 0.781*** 1.791*** 2.696***
2012 ref ref ref
2013 n.s. n.s. 0.601***
2014 1.738*** 0.639*** 0.618***
2015 1.541*** 0.684*** 0.664***
2016 1.351*** 0.720*** 0.730***
2017 0.563*** 1.834*** 0.264***
Previous forecast 
value
Q1 ref ref ref
Q2 1.815*** 0.529*** 0.668***
Q3 2.764*** 0.346*** 0.665***
Q4 5.686*** 0.169*** 1.194***
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Tab. 6: Continued
   Model 11
Dependent 
variable: 
Negative 
Revision
Model 12
Dependent 
variable:  
Positive Revision
Model 13
Dependent 
variable:
Abs. Revision 
≥ 0.5 pt
Intercept 0.272*** 2.449*** 0.214***
Pseudo R2 (MacFadden/ Nagelkerke) 0.0927/ 0.1605 0.0889/ 0.1518
0.1445/ 
0.2156
Confusion Matrix Accuracy 64.84 % 66.70 % 79.87 %
df 24,712 24,712 24,712
N 24,739 24,739 24,739
Method: MLE. Signif. codes : ***: Pr. < 0.001. **: Pr. < 0.01. *: Pr. < 0.05
aSource: Forecasts Database Subset
of coming economic bursts (model 10). Distance to horizon as well as 
production year also bear salient outcomes. First, the distance to horizon 
once again hints at a non-linear temporality in forecasting. Indeed, the 
6 to 12-month-ahead period is the most closely associated with forecast 
revision, whatever its sign, as well as, by far, with stronger revisions. 
Secondly, considering odds ratio, 2008 and 2009 appear as years during 
which forecasts underwent massive revisions. Yet, while many negative 
revisions occurred in 2008, the following year 2009 is associated to pos-
itive revisions. Interestingly, odds ratio for positive revisions are not sig-
nificant in the case of 2008, neither are those for negative revisions in the 
case of 2009. This contrasts with all other years included in the analysis, 
for which a negative association (odds ratio <1) with one particular type 
of revisions (either positive or negative) comes along a positive association 
(odds ratio >1) with the other. That more upward (respectively, down-
ward) forecast revisions than expected occurred in 2009 (respectively, 
2008) does not mean that, the same year, fewer downward (respectively, 
upward) revisions were observed. It reminds that moments of economic 
crises jeopardize former conventions and habits, thus opening the field of 
possibilities: Both deep recession and dazzling recovery seem possible, if 
not likely.
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6.  Discussion and Conclusion
These early results shall be considered with caution. They require con-
solidation through further analyses. In particular, testing hypotheses 
on smaller subsets would allow restraining the analysis to one country 
at a time, excluding some years, and would therefore prevent an over-
determination of statistical results by some singular socio-historical 
configurations. Besides, factor analyses would enable studying forecast 
revisions with a different stance, emphasizing a ‘mutatis mutandis’ rather 
than a ‘ceteris paribus’ perspective to shed light on the congruence and 
correlation between variables.
The inquiry however highlights some features of forecasters’ work. First, 
and unsurprisingly, forecasting is partly data-driven. Indeed, forecasting 
organizations do not hold an instrumental role per se. The homogeneity of 
models and methods amongst organizations demonstrates the similarities 
of economic reasoning across the world of forecasting. Economic infor-
mation is treated in such similar ways that little differences arise between 
forecasting organizations. Forecast revisions trace shifts in expectations 
and representations of the future, whether major or minor. Mostly are they 
nothing but adjustments, which marks the incorporation of new, though 
sometimes significant, data. Studying the kind of data leading to such 
changes is a promising lead for further research, as it may enable investi-
gating the categories of thought according to which forecasters apprehend 
the economy. Forecasters have to identify what is supposedly relevant 
within a plethoric and ever-growing economic information, so that not 
all data can serve as input to econometric models. The analysis of how 
forecasters select information, and how their selection principles evolve 
across time, would give the opportunity to understand macroeconomic 
thinking in the making and, eventually, to study together both the nar-
rative and calculative dimensions of forecasting. How expectations form 
and change arises from the dynamics of forecasting, i.e. from forecasters’ 
working practices, which involve the tasks of selecting, questioning, 
interpreting and incorporating newly available economic information to 
produce forecasts for a certain type of clientele or audience. In the end, 
expecting means revising, adjusting, or updating former expectations.
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Paying attention to forecast revisions also emphasizes a two-fold 
non-linearity of economic forecasting. Obviously, it first reflects the 
non-linearity of economic evolutions, especially in the case of crises and 
downturns, by definition disruptive. The Lehman Brothers collapse and its 
aftermath led to huge forecast revisions, especially during years 2008 and 
2009. Secondly, it has to do with the very nature of forecasting and eco-
nomic expertise. One would expect the distance to horizon to be inversely 
related to the amount of available economic information, so that most 
forecast revisions would happen in the final months, when it accumulates 
and grows more precise. The collected data highlights on the contrary that 
forecasts revisions are more likely to occur earlier during the sequence 
of forecasting. Everything goes as if the main features of macroeconomic 
forecasts were fixed between six and twelve months prior to the horizon, 
leaving just some details to set. In line with an informational perspective 
on forecasting, it raises questions as to the nature of the economic data 
that is made available at that precise moment. Altogether, these results 
remind that the time is not a continuous but a discreet variable, whether in 
the economy or within economics.
A Durkheimian perspective on economic evolutions provides a theoret-
ical frame to understand how fictions about the economy change. “Crises,” 
Durkheim writes in his seminal study on Suicide, “[are] disturbances of the 
collective order” (Durkheim 2005, 206). Such ‘anomy,’ as he names it, has 
widespread consequences.
The [social] scale is upset; but a new scale cannot be immediately improvised. 
Time is required for the public conscience to reclassify men and things. So long as 
the social forces thus freed have not regained equilibrium, their respective values 
are unknown and so all regulation is lacking for a time. The limits are unknown 
between the possible and the impossible, what is just and what is unjust, legiti-
mate claims and hopes and those which are immoderate. Consequently, there is 
no restraint upon aspirations.
(Durkheim 2005, 213)
That forecast revisions, in times of crisis, go both upwards and down-
wards seem to confirm the Durkheimian intuition of a widening range of 
possibilities. Major crises contribute to (re-)open the future, by making 
possible or thinkable what was not. Fictions, i.e. representations of the 
future, change. Again, switching narratives eventually alter point forecasts. 
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Yet, another complimentary way to draw on such an argument instead 
considers the combination of downward and upward revisions of forecasts 
as a way to keep the future unchanged. Forecasters indeed distribute and, 
through the notion of ‘horizon’, categorize a continuous time into discreet 
temporalities (short-, medium- and long-term), and assign each of them 
to differing explanatory models. Investigating forecasters’ practices shows 
that each horizon involves a singular bundle of concepts and techniques. 
The analysis of economic conditions in the last few months of an on-going 
year makes use of economic data about the first quarter or semester of 
the same year, which have then been made public by national statistical 
agencies. Conversely, economic conjuncture cannot take part in longer-
term forecasting, which provides statements about economic structures – 
Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU), potential 
GDP, or potential growth are then crucial notions. Revising long-term 
forecasts therefore means re-investigating how economic structures trans-
late into numbers. Provided that, in times of crisis, downward revisions 
are more closely associated to short-term forecasts and upward revisions 
to medium-term forecasts, their combination brings about a same depic-
tion of the long-term economic future as prior to the crisis. In this per-
spective, crises are nothing but temporary perturbations. Medium term 
would then matches what Durkheim defines as the “required time to 
regain equilibrium.” In times of crisis, fictions about the economic future, 
for the shaping of which forecasting is instrumental, change dramatically. 
Yet, forecasters still share a same belief:  that, in the long run, equilib-
rium will prevail, and that the potential output will only slightly change. 
In this respect, economic theories would operate less as “instruments of 
imagination” fueling actors’ imagination (Beckert 2016, 245–68) than as 
constraints restraining forecasters’.
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Appendix A: Forecasts Publication Date
Tab. 7: Source: ‘Forecasts Database’
  Consensus 
Forecasts
CBO
Budget and 
Economic 
Outlook
EC
Economic 
Forecasts
IMF
World 
Economic 
Outlook
OECD
Economic 
Outlook
2006 Sept./ Dec. Aug. Nov. Sept. Jun./ Dec.
2007 Mar./ Jun./ 
Sept./ Dec.
Jan./ Aug. Feb./ May/ 
Sept./ Nov.
Mar./ Sept. Jun./ Dec.
2008 Mar./ Jun./ 
Sept./ Dec.
Jan./ Sept. Feb./ May/ 
Sept./ Nov.
Mar./ Sept. Jun./ Sept./ 
Dec.
2009 Mar./ Jun./ 
Sept./ Dec.
Jan./ Mar./ 
Aug.
May/ Sept./ 
Nov.
Mar./ Sept. Mar./ Jun./ 
Sept./ Nov.
2010 Mar./ Jun./ 
Sept./ Dec.
Jan./ Aug. Feb./ May/ 
Sept./ Nov.
Mar./ Sept. May/ Nov.
2011 Mar./ Jun/ 
Sept.
Jan./ Aug. Feb./ May/ 
Nov.
Mar./ Sept. May/ Nov.
2012 Jan./ Mar./ 
Jun/ Sept./ 
Dec.
Jan./ Aug. May/ Nov. Mar./ Sept. May/ Sept./ 
Nov.
2013 Mar./ Jun./ 
Sept./ Dec.
Feb. Feb./ May/ 
Nov.
Mar./ Sept. May/ Sept./ 
Nov.
2014 Mar./ Jun./ 
Sept./ Dec.
Feb./ Aug. Feb./ May/ 
Nov.
Mar./ Sept. Sept./ Nov.
2015 Mar./ Jun./ 
Sept./ Dec.
Jan./ Aug. Feb./ May/ 
Nov.
Mar./ Sept. Mar./ Jun./ 
Sept./ Nov.
2016 Mar./ Jun./ 
Sept./ Dec.
Jan./ Aug. Feb./ May/ 
Nov.
Mar./ Sept. Feb./ Jun./ 
Sept./ Nov.
2017 Mar./ Jun./ 
Sept./ Dec.
Jan./ Jun. Feb./ May/ 
Nov.
Mar./ Sept. Mar./ Jun./ 
Sept.
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Appendix B: Panel Overview
Tab. 8: Source: ‘Forecasts Database’ Subset
 Variable and Modalities N %
     
Country 29,713 100
Eurozone 5,538 18.6
France 4,109 13.8
Germany 5,570 18.7
Japan 4,153 14.0
United Kingdom 4,876 16.4
United States 5,467 18.4
Macroeconomic Aggregate 29,713 100
GDP 14,988 50.4
Inflation 14,725 49.6
Distance to Horizon 29,713 100
0 to 5 months 7,313 24.6
6 to 12 months 10,692 36.0
13 to 18 months 7,621 25.6
19 to 24 months 4,087 13.8
Forecasters 29,713 100
Major Banks 7,137 24.0
Bank of America – Merrill Lynch 1,026 3.5
Citigroup 910 3.1
Crédit Suisse 530 1.8
Goldman Sachs 1,004 3.4
HSBC 899 3.0
JP Morgan 726 2.4
Morgan Stanley 654 2.2
UBS 868 2.9
Unicredit 520 1.8
Other banks 8,997 30.3
Public institutions 2,096 7.1
Congressional Budget Office 92 0.3
European Commission 736 2.5
IMF 550 1.9
OECD 718 2.4
Other organizations 11,483 38.6
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Tab. 8: Continued
 Variable and Modalities N %
Production year 29,713 100
2006 1,342 4.5
2007 2,647 8.9
2008 2,643 8.9
2009 2,514 8.5
2010 2,506 8.4
2011 1,896 6.4
2012 3,107 10.5
2013 2,658 8.9
2014 2,684 9.0
2015 2,779 9.4
2016 2,792 9.4
2017 2,145 7.2
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